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Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, executive compensation arose at a
rapid scale — with many in the labor force displaced or facing unemployment,
many questioned how the excessive compensation packages of Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs) reflected in actual firm performance. However, executive
compensation has been a mainstay topic in academic literature. Researchers have
attempted to unearth the exponentially growing paychecks or the link between
compensation and other firm factors (market performance, employee satisfaction,
CEO perception, etc.).
This study aims to examine the relationship between S&P 500 CEO
compensation and the innovation levels of their firms; through this, we hope to
understand the factors driving innovation in a firm and if increased compensation
links to sales-oriented research and development. Data was obtained for
companies listed on the S&P 500, detailing research quotient, total executive
compensation, salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock options from 2000 to 2020.
Year-on-year data was then pooled to provide a detailed picture and measure the
impact of these compensation-based variables against the research quotient —
defined as a firm's ability to generate revenue growth from R&D investments.
In response to our hypothesis, our data showed significance at the 90% level
regarding the impact of total executive compensation and stock options on a higher
RQ value. Our regressions, however, did not show statistical significance of the
effect of salary, bonus, and restricted stock on the research quotients. From 2010
to 2020, CEO compensation has increased by 59.6%; the proportion contributed
by restricted stock of total compensation has increased by 90.6%, while the
proportion of stock options to total compensation has decreased by 148.3%.
Despite these differences, this research concludes that stock options are the only
component of compensation that has a positive statistically significant impact on
innovation productivity.
Keywords: CEO, innovation, compensation, restricted stock, stock options, research quotient
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Literature Review
Compensation History
Extensive research has been conducted with regards to Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
compensation trends. Over time, real compensation numbers have grown but it is important to
understand executive compensation history to grasp current compensation trends.
Frydman and Jenter published a thorough review of S&P 500 compensation history in the
National Bureau of Economic Research, in which they classify different eras of chief executive
compensation. Prior to the 1980s, most compensation was composed of largely base salaries with
additional performance bonuses; these bonuses were tied to basic performance metrics and
fulfilled either in cash or stock. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the rise of compensation
linked to stock options rose dramatically. Median CEO pay in the S&P 500 increased 213% from
1992 to 2001, for example while option compensation comprised 20% of CEO pay in 1992 but
rose to 49% by 2000.1
The make-up of an average S&P 500 CEO’s

Table 1: Mean S&P 500 CEO Compensation by Component

compensation is categorized by component in
Table 1; in post-recession years, another trend
emerges by which equity-based incentives
(restricted stock, performance shares, etc.)
compose chief executive compensation at an
increasingly rapid rate. The reduction in options
awards can be attributed to dysfunctional
consequences that options-laden compensation
can induce, such as earnings manipulation, timing
of positive or negative news, or malicious use of insider information.23

1

Frydman, Carola, and Dirk Jenter. 2010. "CEO Compensation." National Bureau of Economic Research 3-8.
Lovett, Steve, Abdul Rasheed, and Wanrong Hou. 2022. "Stock options, restricted stock, salary, or bonus?
Managing CEO compensation to maximize organizational performance." Business Horizons (Elsevier) 65
(2): 115-123.
3
Zhang, Xiaomeng, Kathryn Bartol, Ken Smith, Michael Pfarrer, and Dmitry Khanin. 2008. "CEOs on the Edge:
Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive Misalignment." Academy of Management Journal
(Academy of Management) 51 (2): 241-258.
2
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Compensation and Risk-Taking
In a research context, compensation has been defined as the sum of “salary, bonus, cash pay,
or equity” and used accordingly in regressions as a proxy for compensation — either by
component or cumulatively.4 While a similar approach is used in this research, there is a variety
of literature that uses different models for compensation.5 However, by separating the various
components of compensation, we are able to identify if any have a specific linkage to innovation
in a firm.
Frydman and Jenter assert that “stronger equity incentives are associated with less risk
taking, whereas convexity in executives’ portfolios due to options is correlated with more risk
taking.”6 Another work published in the Journal of Accounting and Economics notes the
relationship between potential CEO payoffs and risk-taking responsiveness: “Options affect
corporate risk-taking and highlight the importance of a board structuring its executives'
compensation packages to induce the desired level of risk taking.”7 Options provide potentially
higher payoffs than equity-based compensation, and CEOs calculate risk-taking accordingly.
Compensation in the form of options correlates to risk-taking; literature aside, this is evident in
companies that pride themselves on their bold brands — such as Tesla, where 100% of Elon
Musk’s compensation is received in options. The literature analyzing compensation and risk is
especially important in the context of this study, as innovative R&D can be one component of
risk, in addition to other “risky” actions such as firm acquisition activity, leverage levels, or labor
force planning.

Existing Innovation Research Metrics
Several measures of innovation have been explored; the largest group of metrics come under
the category of patent-based measures. Yet, the use of patents as a basis of innovation has long
been deemed as an imperfect approach to quantifying a firm’s true R&D productivity. For

4

Banker, Rajiv, Masako Darrough, Rong Huang, and Jose Plehn-Dujowich. 2013. "The Relation between CEO
Compensation and Past Performance." The Accounting Review (American Accounting Association) 88 (1):
10-13.
5
Gormley, Todd, David Matsa, and Todd Milbourn. 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a
natural experiment." Journal of Accounting and Economics (Elsevier) 56 (2-3): 79-101.
6
Frydman, Carola, and Dirk Jenter. 2010. "CEO Compensation." National Bureau of Economic Research 25.
7
Gormley, Todd, David Matsa, and Todd Milbourn. 2013. "CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a
natural experiment." Journal of Accounting and Economics (Elsevier) 56 (2-3): 79-101.
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reference, only 50% of firm innovations are ever patented, and are done so only as a last resort;
patents put ideas into the public domain, making workarounds possible and affecting a firm’s
first-mover competitive advantage.8 Other approaches to measuring innovation vary – from
measuring firm stock returns at the time patents are granted, to identifying the number of unique
classes of technology a firm’s patent count crosses.910 A 2000 study of technology firms
concluded that CEO pay contingent on technological milestones resulted in higher levels of
innovation; this study used salary and bonus to capture short-term pay, and an estimation process
to capture equity-based compensation — unlike our research, where the data for equity-based
compensation is readily available on WRDS — and R&D spending and patent count as the basis
for innovation.11 More recent research (published in 2019) analyzes the relationship between
option-based compensation and patents filed around the enactment of FAS 123R, an accounting
change enacted in 2006 that ensures firms deduct the amount of equity payment for employees.12
Their study found that option-based compensation did not have a causal impact on corporate
innovation. Our work seeks to add to growing literature on the relationship between
compensation and innovation, using a less patent-dependent approach to measuring innovation.
Research Quotient (RQ)
Professor Anne Marie Knott of Washington University in St. Louis developed Research
Quotient (RQ) as an alternative measure to quantifying innovation. In RQ Innovative Efficiency
and Firm Value, the authors note that the specific type of innovation measure is important in
research design (input, output, and efficiency); as we seek to determine the relationship between
compensation and innovation productivity, RQ — defined as a measure of a firm’s ability to
generate revenue growth from R&D investments— helps in identifying efficient research and
development.13 RQ could be a valuable metric for those looking to understand how to better their

8

Knott, Anne-Marie, Michael Cooper, and Wenhao Yang. 2015. "RQ Innovative Efficiency and Firm Value."
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
9
Kogan, Leonid, Dimitris Papanikolaou, Amit Seru, and Noah Stoffman. 2017. "Technological Innovation,
Resource Allocation, and Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132 (2): 665-712.
10
Hirshleifer, David, Po-Hsuan Hsu, and Dongmei Li. 2017. "Innovative Originality, Profitability, and Stock
Returns." National Bureau of Economic Research.
11
Balkin, David, Gideon Markman, and Luis Gomez-Mejia. 2000. "Is CEO Pay in High-Technology Firms Related
to Innovation?" The Academy of Management Journal (Academy of Management) 43 (6): 1118-1129.
12
Biggerstaff, Lee, Brian Blank, and Brad Goldie. 2019. "Do incentives work? Option-based compensation and
corporate innovation ." Journal of Corporate Finance 415-430.
13
Knott, Anne-Marie, Michael Cooper, and Wenhao Yang. 2015. "RQ Innovative Efficiency and Firm Value."
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
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own organization’s R&D-to-revenue pipeline; the metric also provides broader coverage
compared to patent-based measures of innovation. RQ has also been used in previous chief
executive research, one example being the examination of R&D productivity between “outsider”
versus insider CEOs.14 In this work, the authors used RQ, along with a newer metric called “Idea
TFP”, to conclude that firms with outside CEOs display lower RQ levels than firms with internal
chief executives — thus have lower R&D productivity.
Research Overview
Executive compensation varies in form — from incentive-ridden contracts to standard
salaries; with the selected sample of S&P 500 companies, this research will focus on CEOs with
base salaries, performance-based incentives, or a combination of the two. Borne from an
overabundance of existing measures to determine a firm’s innovation level that were largely
dependent on patent counts, RQ reflects the percentage increase in revenue a company obtains
from a one percent increase in R&D, holding all else constant.
S&P 500 firms were chosen as a representative for all large-cap companies; the S&P 500 is a
credible sample pool as its composition covers a breadth of different markets. A commonly cited
disadvantage to using the S&P 500 is that the index is weighted, meaning that the performance
of larger companies (such as Microsoft, Amazon, Apple, etc.) influences the index significantly.
However, this research will focus on each firm individually and there will be no weighting of the
sum of S&P 500 firms.
By analyzing the relationship between CEO compensation and RQ, we will learn how
compensation affects a CEO’s propensity to invest into innovation at their firm. Through this
research, we hope to identify compensation patterns that result in high yields of productive
innovation — an insight that would be useful for firms experiencing a lag in innovation looking
to restructure management. This research is beneficial to managers and executives seeking to
understand how to position their innovation policies (across factors including R&D spending,
capital investments, marketing expenses, etc.) to improve both their firms’ innovative
productivity.

14

Cummings, Trey, and Anne Marie Knott. 2017. "Outside CEOs and Innovation." Strategic Management Journal
(Strategic Management Journal) 39 (1): 1-48.
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Empirical Approach
Our goal is to determine if our hypothesis that CEOs who receive a sizable proportion of
incentive-based clauses as compensation are more likely to manage firms with higher innovation
levels holds under a large-scale quantitative analysis. Our empirical approach begins with simple
fixed-effects regressions of the relationship between CEO compensation and RQ:
𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽# ∗ (𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)!" + 𝛽$ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"
We model RQ of firm i in fiscal year t (𝑅𝑄!" ) as a function of CEO Compensation and firm size
measured as the log of employees and revenue. We include firm-fixed effects (𝜂! ) as well as year
effects (𝜆" ), and cluster standard errors by firm.
Research Quotient (RQ) is the firm-specific output of R&D – the g exponent in firm i’s
production function. It is interpreted as the percentage increase in revenues from a 1% increase
in R&D when other inputs and their elasticities are held constant.
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 %! ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟&! ∗ 𝑅&𝐷'! ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 (! ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔)!
RQ is estimated with a random coefficients model using successive seven-year windows of firm
financial data, with Output defined as the firm’s operating margin. This estimation process and
its robustness checks are described in the user manual for the WRDS RQ database, where we
obtained the RQ data for our model.
We decided to use RQ in our model as the R&D measure because it is universal, uniform, and
dependable. Other measures of R&D – such as patent counts – aren’t universal as not all firms
engaging in R&D patent their innovations. In any given year, less than 50% of firms engaged in
R&D file patents. In addition, even among the firms that patent their innovations, they do not
always patent all of their innovations as its typically more effective to protect intellectual
property by keeping it a secret. Finally, a higher number of patents does not reliably predict
higher profits and market value which is the expected outcome from R&D investments.
RQ is estimated entirely from standard financial data, so it can be calculated for any firm doing
R&D. Since it is a ratio, it is uniform across all firms regardless of currency. It is reliable as firm
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behavior and economic outcomes are consistent with endogenous growth theory (and validated
over 47 years): Optimal R&D, market value, and firm growth all increase in RQ (A. M. Knott
2012).
Hypothesis
We hypothesize that CEOs who receive a sizable proportion of incentive-based clauses as
compensation are more likely to manage firms with higher innovation levels; since their
compensation is based on performance, chief executives are eager to differentiate their firms
from others through an increased focus on innovation and long-term sustainability. Therefore,
our first hypothesis relates total executive compensation and research quotient:
H1: Total executive compensation is positively associated with the research quotient.
Regression: 𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽* + 𝛽# ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑇𝐷𝐶1)!" + 𝛽$ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)!" +
𝛽+ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"
Previous literature has shown that the prevalence of salary, bonus, and perks have remained
constant in the S&P 500 over the last 11 years. This is indicative of the growing reliance on
performance-related vehicles of compensation. Therefore, it is important to understand which of
the four components of stock compensation have the largest impact on RQ.
H2: Restricted stock and stock options will have a greater significance when predicting
RQ than salary and bonus.
Regression: 𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽* + 𝛽# ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦)!" + 𝛽$ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠)!" +
𝛽+ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠)!" + 𝛽, ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠)!" + 𝛽- ∗
(𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝛽. ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"
As previous literature has proven, compensation risk is imposed on executives by linking
executive’s wealth to firm performance to motivate the executive to take actions that are in the
best interest of the shareholders15. Therefore, in addition to our previous hypotheses, we
hypothesize that restricted stocks granted (var: stock_awards_fv) would be positively significant
when estimating RQ, while stock options granted (var: option_awards_fv) would not be
15

Core, Guay, and Larcker, “Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives.”
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significant. Restricted stock represents actual ownership in the company which grant the
employee all the same voting rights and responsibilities as any other owner of the same class of
shares. In contrast, stock options do not have an actual ownership over the company at the time
of issuance. They merely function as an agreement between the company and the employee that
gives the employee the option to purchase the company’s stock at a predetermined price by a set
date in the future. Therefore, the CEOs that are offered restricted stock as a portion of their total
executive compensation likely have the same ownership rights as the founders of the company
and thus would have more of a stake in the future success of the company, thus are more likely to
be innovative.16
H3: The sum of restricted stocks granted and stock options as a fraction of total executive
compensation is positively correlated with RQ.
Regression: 𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽* + 𝛽# ∗ (

/"012 456789:;<"!0= 456789
>0"6? @0A<B=96"!0=

)!" + 𝛽$ ∗

(𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝛽+ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"
H3a: Restricted stocks granted as a fraction of total executive compensation is positively
associated with RQ.
Regression: 𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽* + 𝛽# ∗ (

/"012 456789
)
>0"6? @0A<B=96"!0= !"

+ 𝛽$ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)!" +

𝛽+ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"
H3b: Stock options as a fraction of total executive compensation is negatively associated
with RQ.
;<"!0= 456789

Regression: Regression: 𝑅𝑄!" = 𝛽* + 𝛽# ∗ (>0"6? @0A<B=96"!0=)!" + 𝛽$ ∗
(𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝛽+ ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔_𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)!" + 𝜂! + 𝜆" + 𝜀!"

16

Moisan, “Council Post.”
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Data
The main data for our research comes from sources within the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS): Compustat, RQ, and Execucomp databases. The Compustat is used for a firm’s
financial data; the RQ database for firms’ research quotient (RQ); and the Execucomp database
for detailed executive compensation packages. Our raw data consists of companies publicly
listed on the S&P500 that have published R&D expenditure over the years 2000 to 2020 which
were merged in Stata using the combined gvkey-fyear that identifies each firm by year.
Variable Name
Executive Total
Compensation

Database Name
tdc1

Units
thousands

stock_awards_fv

Meaning
Calculated under the 1992 reporting
format. The amount is the sum of the
following: Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity
Incentive Plan Compensation, GrantDate Fair Value of Option Awards,
Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards,
Deferred Compensation Earnings
Reported as Compensation, and Other
Compensation
Dollar value of base salary earned by
the named executive officer during the
fiscal year
Dollar value of bonus earned by the
named executive officer during the
fiscal year
Fair value of restricted stock granted

Salary

salary

Bonus

bonus

Restricted Stock
Stock Options

option_awards_fv

Fair value of stock options granted

thousands

Fraction of Equity
Compensation

(stock_awards_fv +
option_awards_fv)/tdc1

decimal

Fraction of
Restricted Stock
Fraction of Stock
Options

stock_awards_fv/tdc1

Equity compensation (restricted stock
plus stock options) as a fraction of
executive total compensation
Restricted Stock as a fraction of
executive total compensation
Stock Options as a fraction of executive
total compensation

option_awards_fv/tdc1

thousands
thousands
thousands

decimal
decimal

Table 1. Independent Variables

Bhandari, Kleban 10

Variables
RQ, our primary dependent variable, is the firm-specific output elasticity of R&D and was
gathered directly from the WRDS RQ database. In addition to our dependent variable and
explanatory variables, we introduced various control variables in our full model. To control for
the known relationship between firm scale and R&D spending, we used two measures of firm
size: Employees and Revenue.
Variable Name
Employees

Database Name
log(1+emp)

Revenues

log(1+revt)

Meaning
the log value of full-time equivalent employees
measured
the log value of company revenues in million
dollars

Units
1,000
employees
millions

Table 2. Control Variables.

In addition to the control variables, we include year effects and firm-fixed effects to control for
macroeconomic variations across time and time invariant firm effects, respectively. We used the
logarithmic transformation to help reduce the skewness in the control and independent variables.
After the transformation, the mean of each compensation variable is approximately equal to the
median.
Analysis was limited to firms that had a reported total asset, raw RQ values, and executive total
compensation. Duplicate observations were deleted. Observations for which any variable lies in
the top or bottom 1 percent of its distribution were deleted. Execucomp and Compustat had
missing values, thus limiting the analysis. This limited analysis left us with 3,609 observations
across 227 firms in 20 years. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics that characterize our sample
of firms.
Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

RQ

3609

0.098

0.035

0.008

0.547

Total Executive
Compensation
Employees

3609

10698.210

11112.270

0.001

280621.600

3609

44.517

70.707

0.313

1298

Revenues

3609

20498.290

40044.470

58.941

433526.000

Salary

3609

1043.947

463.088

0

4000

Bonus

3609

472.893

1275.061

0

43511.540
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Restricted Stock

3609

3960.373

8598.757

0

276612.100

Stock Options

3609

1777.473

4342.180

0

90693.400

Fraction Restricted Stock +
Stock Option Based
Compensation

3609

0.445

0.324

0

0.999

Fraction of Restricted Stock
Based Compensation

3609

0.290

0.291

0

0.999

Fraction of Stock Option
Based Compensation

3609

0.155

0.218

0

0.999

Table 3. Data Descriptive Statistics

Results
Our results present several key findings for understanding the effect of CEO compensation on
risk innovation. We will first discuss total executive compensation effect, then break it down into
its components of salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock options. Finally, we will look at the
effect of the fraction of equity compensation over total executive compensation as it pertains to
risk innovation.
Regression Results (Total Executive Compensation)
Variable
Total Executive
Compensation
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.073

0.038

1.95

0.052

-0.001

0.148

0.022
-0.031
-0.011

0.004
0.004
0.029

5.04
-8.74
-0.38

0.000
0.000
0.703

0.013
-0.038
-0.068

0.031
-0.024
0.046

Table 4. Total Executive Compensation Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors.

Variable
Salary
Bonus
Restricted Stock
Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient
-0.029
-0.032
0.008
0.049
0.023
-0.031
-0.005

Standard Error
0.044
0.030
0.018
0.020
0.004
0.003
0.028

t
-0.65
-1.08
0.46
2.45
5.34
-9.11
-0.19

P>|T|
0.513
0.282
0.644
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.846

95% Confidence Interval
-0.116
0.058
-0.091
0.027
-0.027
0.043
0.010
0.088
0.014
0.031
-0.038
-0.024
-0.061
0.050

Table 5. Executive Compensation Components Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors.

Table 4 presents the empirical results in line with H1 which indicate that Total Executive
Compensation is positively associated with RQ (Coeff = 0.073, t-statistic = 1.95) at a 10%
significance level. It indicates that a change in Total Executive Compensation of 1 unit ($1,000)
is correlated with a .005 increase in RQ holding all else constant.
Bhandari, Kleban 12

Table 5 presents evidence that both Salary and Bonus are negative but not statistically significant
(Coeff. = -0.029, t-statistic = -0.65, Coeff. = -0.032, t-statistic = -1.08 respectively). Restricted
Stock is positive but not statistically significant (Coeff. = 0.008, t-statistic = 0.46). Stock
Options, on the other hand, is positively correlated with RQ at a 5% significance level (Coeff. =
0.049, t-statistic = 2.45). For a one thousand dollar increase in the face value of Stock Options,
there is a 0.003 increase in RQ. This is in line with H2 as stock options have a higher
significance when predicting RQ than salary and bonus; however, it also shows that restricted
stock is not as significant as these variables.
Regression Outputs (Fraction of Equity Compensation)
Variable
Fraction of RS
+ Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.230

0.273

0.84

0.401

-0.308

0.768

0.022
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.004
0.029

5.21
-8.81
-0.27

0.000
0.000
0.788

0.014
-0.038
-0.064

0.031
-0.024
0.049

Table 6. Fraction of Equity Compensation Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors.

Variable
Fraction of
Restricted Stock
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

-0.180

0.262

-0.69

0.492

-0.698

0.337

0.023
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.003
0.029

5.23
-8.84
-0.27

0.000
0.000
0.784

0.014
-0.038
-0.065

0.031
-0.024
0.049

Table 7. Fraction of Restricted Stock Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors.

Variable
Fraction of
Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.561

0.292

1.92

0.056

-0.014

1.135

0.023
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.003
0.029

5.29
-8.93
-0.29

0.000
0.000
0.769

0.014
-0.038
-0.065

0.031
-0.024
0.048

Table 8. Fraction of Stock Options Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors.

Table 6 depicts a positive, yet not statistically significant relationship between the fraction of
restricted stock and stock option awards of total executive compensation (Coeff. = 0.230, tstatistic = 0.84). Table 7 presents the empirical results indicating that fraction of restricted stock
of total executive compensation is not associated with RQ. The coefficient is negative but not
significant (Coeff. = -0.180, t-statistic = -0.69). Table 8 presents empirical results that fraction of
stock option awards of total executive compensation is positive and correlated with RQ at a 10%
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significance level (Coeff. = 0.561, t-statistic = 1.92). A one unit increase in the fraction of stock
options as a part of total executive compensation increases RQ by 0.005.
This finding is contrary to our original hypothesis H3 that the sum of restricted stock and stock
options as a fraction of total executive compensation is positively correlated with RQ. Due to the
positive association of stock options with RQ (contrary to H3B), it can be noted that the fraction
of restricted stock over total executive compensation, which is not correlated with RQ (contrary
to H3A), counteracts the positive association of stock options causing the sum of restricted stock
and stock options as a fraction of total executive compensation to be not statistically significant.
Limitations
One limitation within our study was that some companies listed on the S&P500 did either: (1)
not appear on WRDS’s Compustat, Execucomp, and/or RQ databases; (2) not have sufficient
data for the 2000-2020 years that we were examining. Our research was very dependent on
having all values for the research quotient, executive compensation, salary, bonus, restricted
stock, and stock options, and therefore, companies that did not publicly list all of these data
points were removed as observations. However, our findings still align with past economic
models, and could be used for future research.
Additionally, while we were able to find past literature that stated there is a definitive link
between CEO compensation and innovation productivity within a firm and addressed one
potential avenue of causality through lagging RQ, there is still a potential for endogeneity within
our data.
Future Research
There are several different avenues this research could progress in the future. One such way
would be a more in-depth examination of S&P 500 companies, segmenting by industry for
executives to have more clarity on how their respective firms innovate compared to competitors.
Another way of furthering this research could include examining compensation structures of
senior executives (and chief executives) in startups; this research would be beneficial for
founders seeking optimal compensation structures for innovative yield in their companies.
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However, the compensation structures would look different for startups versus the publicly
traded companies discussed in this paper, and many more estimations would be needed in
calculating research quotient than required for the firms listed in this paper. Future research
could additionally expand to examine smaller-scale companies and what percentage of total
executive compensation should be salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock options for CEOs. It
would be interesting to see if there is a correlation between growth rate of a company and the
percentage of each component that yields the highest research quotient (gamma value) for that
firm.
Conclusion
To promote innovation from a CEO — if companies are only focused on the research quotient as
a measure of firm innovation — then our study shows that CEO compensation could
theoretically be granted in the form of entirely stock options. This would give the highest
research quotient for the firm, as proven by our data. However, there are reasons as to why
companies might not want to give their CEOs compensation in the form of 100% stock options,
which include: (1) base salary provides security for CEOs; (2) bonuses help drive performance
against short term objectives set by the board; (3) restricted stock increases ownership and aligns
interests with shareholders.
In alignment with the Black-Scholes model for option pricing, CEOs can increase the price of
their option in two manners: (1) Increasing current stock price; (2) Increasing volatility of
underlying asset. By undergoing riskier projects, CEOs can increase stock volatility, which in
turn increases the stock price and the call option, thus giving CEOs a higher payout. Stock
options promote this sense of high-risk decision making; CEOs share the upside, if successful,
but do not share the downside risk with the company. Restricted stock pay, on the other hand,
discourages CEOs from investing in high-risk, potentially high-margin products as they have
ownership in the company, thus face the risk of sharing the losses if the project does not have
high returns.
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Appendix
Variable Name
Executive Total
Compensation

tdc1

Database Name

Units
thousands

stock_awards_fv

Meaning
Calculated under the 1992 reporting
format. The amount is the sum of the
following: Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity
Incentive Plan Compensation, GrantDate Fair Value of Option Awards,
Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards,
Deferred Compensation Earnings
Reported as Compensation, and Other
Compensation
Dollar value of base salary earned by
the named executive officer during the
fiscal year
Dollar value of bonus earned by the
named executive officer during the
fiscal year
Fair value of restricted stock granted

Salary

salary

Bonus

bonus

Restricted Stock
Stock Options

option_awards_fv

Fair value of stock options granted

thousands

Fraction of Equity
Compensation

(stock_awards_fv +
option_awards_fv)/tdc1

decimal

Fraction of
Restricted Stock
Fraction of Stock
Options

stock_awards_fv/tdc1

Equity compensation (restricted stock
plus stock options) as a fraction of
executive total compensation
Restricted Stock as a fraction of
executive total compensation
Stock Options as a fraction of executive
total compensation

option_awards_fv/tdc1

thousands
thousands
thousands

decimal
decimal

Table 1. Independent Variables

Variable Name
Employees

Database Name
log(1+emp)

Revenues

log(1+revt)

Meaning
the log value of full-time equivalent employees
measured
the log value of company revenues in million
dollars

Units
1,000
employees
millions

Table 2. Control Variables
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Variables

Obs.
3609

Mean
0.098

Std. Dev.
0.035

Min
0.008

Max
0.547

Total Executive
Compensation
Employees

3609

10698.210

11112.270

0.001

280621.600

3609

44.517

70.707

0.313

1298

Revenues

3609

20498.290

40044.470

58.941

433526.000

Salary

3609

1043.947

463.088

0

4000

Bonus

3609

472.893

1275.061

0

43511.540

Restricted Stock

3609

3960.373

8598.757

0

276612.100

Stock Options

3609

1777.473

4342.180

0

90693.400

Fraction Restricted Stock +
Stock Option Based
Compensation

3609

0.445

0.324

0

0.999

Fraction of Restricted Stock
Based Compensation

3609

0.290

0.291

0

0.999

Fraction of Stock Option
Based Compensation

3609

0.155

0.218

0

0.999

RQ

Table 3. Data Descriptive
Statistics
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Regression Results (Total Executive Compensation)
Variable
Total Executive
Compensation
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.073

0.038

1.95

0.052

-0.001

0.148

0.022
-0.031
-0.011

0.004
0.004
0.029

5.04
-8.74
-0.38

0.000
0.000
0.703

0.013
-0.038
-0.068

0.031
-0.024
0.046

Table 4. Total Executive Compensation Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors

Variable
Salary
Bonus
Restricted Stock
Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient
-0.029
-0.032
0.008
0.049
0.023
-0.031
-0.005

Standard Error
0.044
0.030
0.018
0.020
0.004
0.003
0.028

t
-0.65
-1.08
0.46
2.45
5.34
-9.11
-0.19

P>|T|
0.513
0.282
0.644
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.846

95% Confidence Interval
-0.116
0.058
-0.091
0.027
-0.027
0.043
0.010
0.088
0.014
0.031
-0.038
-0.024
-0.061
0.050

Table 5. Executive Compensation Components Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors

Regression Outputs (Fraction of Equity Compensation)
Variable
Fraction of RS
+ Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.230

0.273

0.84

0.401

-0.308

0.768

0.022
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.004
0.029

5.21
-8.81
-0.27

0.000
0.000
0.788

0.014
-0.038
-0.064

0.031
-0.024
0.049

Table 6. Fraction of Equity Compensation Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors

Variable
Fraction of
Restricted Stock
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

-0.180

0.262

-0.69

0.492

-0.698

0.337

0.023
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.003
0.029

5.23
-8.84
-0.27

0.000
0.000
0.784

0.014
-0.038
-0.065

0.031
-0.024
0.049

Table 7. Fraction of Restricted Stock Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors

Variable
Fraction of
Stock Options
Revenues
Employees
Constant

Coefficient

Standard Error

t

P>|T|

95% Confidence Interval

0.561

0.292

1.92

0.056

-0.014

1.135

0.023
-0.031
-0.008

0.004
0.003
0.029

5.29
-8.93
-0.29

0.000
0.000
0.769

0.014
-0.038
-0.065

0.031
-0.024
0.048

Table 8. Fraction of Stock Options Regression Outputs for Fixed Effect Model with Cluster-Robust Standard Errors
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